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THE CONGRESS AS SURGE PROTECTOR 
By Neil Kinkopf 
 
Reports indicate that President Bush plans to respond to the deteriorating situation in Iraq 
by substantially increasing the number of American troops deployed there.  (BBC 
1/2/07.)  According to these reports, the President will call for the nation to make 
sacrifices in support of this “surge” in troop levels.  The Constitution makes it quite clear 
that Congress may stop the President from imposing such sacrifices on the nation.  This 
decision is one that rests with our democratic process and is vested originally in 
Congress. 
 
The President’s plan to escalate the war in Iraq is opposed by the overwhelming majority 
of Americans; only 11%, according to a recent CNN poll, believe we should send more 
troops to Iraq (CNN 12/18/06).  These views are evidently shared by the President’s 
strongest supporters.  Columnist Robert Novak’s survey of Senate Republicans shows 
that only 12 support escalation. (Washington Post 1/1/07)  And among the military, 
which has been a staunch supporter of the President’s Iraq policies, now only 35% 
approve of the President’s handling of the war and only 38% support escalation 
according to the annual poll conducted by The Military Times.  (Army Times 12/29/06)  
Additionally, the Baker-Hamilton Commission makes emphatically clear that the 
President’s plan is in opposition to the only bipartisan consensus as to how to move 
forward in Iraq. 
 
Congress Can Forbid the President from Escalating the Iraq War without Renewed 
Authorization 
 
Even if the President does not submit his plan for congressional approval, Congress is 
constitutionally empowered to require him to do so. 
 
The Constitution grants Congress extensive war powers – so extensive, in fact, that Chief 
Justice John Marshall once wrote that “The whole powers of war being, by the 
Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the Acts of that body can alone be 
resorted to as our guides ….”  (Talbot v. Seeman (1801).)  These powers include the 
power to declare war; grant letters of marque and reprisal; raise and support an army and 
navy; make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; provide 
for the calling forth of the militia; and to lay taxes and appropriate funds to provide for 
the common defense, with the proviso that no appropriation for such a purpose can be for 
more than two years.  The President is made the commander in chief and is authorized to 
appoint, with Senate confirmation, such military officers as Congress may by statute 
create.  
 
This structure is an intentional departure from the British approach.  The King was set up, 
in Blackstone’s phrase, as the “generalissimo”; he was authorized to initiate and to 
prosecute war of any scope on his own authority.   Under the U.S. Constitution, by 
contrast, it is Congress that has the power to initiate and regulate war, while the President 
is authorized to command the resulting war effort. 
 
As Commander in Chief, the President’s role is to prosecute the war that Congress has 
authorized.  The President may not go beyond this authorization.   
 
This understanding of the President’s power as Commander in Chief is plain enough 
from the text of the Constitution itself.  It has also been the consistent interpretation of 
the Courts.  Chief Justice John Marshall set forth this interpretation in a series of cases 
arising from the naval war with France.  Most notably, in Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice 
Marshall held that the President’s war powers are defined by statute and may not exceed 
statutory limits.   
 
In the naval war with France, Congress had authorized the U.S. navy to intercept vessels 
bound to, but not from, French ports.  In Little a U.S. navy ship, acting pursuant to a 
presidential order to intercept ships bound to or from French ports, intercepted a 
commercial vessel suspected of coming from a French port.  The Supreme Court ruled 
the action illegal because it went beyond the military force authorized by statute. 
 
The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to this view of the war power.  In 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the famous Steel Seizure case), the Supreme 
Court struck down President Truman’s order that the nation’s steel mills continue 
operating in order to keep the troops in the Korean War armed.  Justice Jackson’s famous 
concurring opinion (which the Supreme Court has since held to set forth the proper view 
of presidential power) emphasized that the Constitution does not set forth exclusive 
power, but overlapping or shared power.  Where Congress and the President share power, 
as in the area of war power, the President is bound to comply with the statutes that 
Congress enacts. 
 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has applied Justice Jackson’s framework to resolve 
challenges to President Bush’s assertions of commander-in-chief power.  In both Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Supreme Court rejected the 
President’s assertion of unilateral authority to conduct military operations (in those cases 
dealing specifically with the detention and treatment of enemy combatants), holding 
instead that the President must comply with applicable statutory limits as well as 
applicable international law.    
 
The Supreme Court has been clear and unambiguous.  When Congress, acting in the vast 
areas of overlapping power, tells the President “no,” the President must comply.  Thus, 
Congress may limit the scope of the present Iraq War by either of two mechanisms.  First, 
it may directly define limits on the scope of that war—and forbid the President from 
exceeding these limits—such as by imposing a ceiling on the number of troops assigned 
to that conflict.  Second, it may achieve the same objective by enacting appropriations 
riders that limit the use of appropriated funds.  Indeed, the reason that the Constitution 
limits military appropriations to two years is to prevent Congress from abdicating its 
responsibility to oversee ongoing military engagements.   
 
The President Should Seek Congressional Assent for His New Iraq War Plans 
 
The Constitution’s drafters understood the immense national sacrifice that war entails.  
Moreover, they understood the advantages that would accrue to the President during 
times of war. For these reasons, the Constitution assigns Congress the power to initiate 
war and to define the parameters of military operations.   The Constitution’s structure, 
then, clearly contemplates that important decisions regarding the scale of war are to be 
made not by the President alone, but through the democratic process.  This is why the 
Constitution mandates Congress’s assent not only to the initiation of a war but to its size 
and scope.   
 
To be sure, Congress has authorized the war in Iraq.  As a legal matter, that authorization 
was drafted broadly enough to encompass the escalation that the President has in 
contemplation.  Nevertheless, the Iraq War authorization was made on the basis of false 
premises that go directly to the President’s case for his planned troop surge.     
 
• On behalf of the Bush Administration, Secretary Rumsfeld testified, 
against the advice of General Eric Shinseki, that the Iraq War could be 
successfully waged with troop levels at or below present number. 
• Secretary Rumsfeld also said that the war would take “six days, six weeks. 
I doubt six months,” and that, quite the opposite of an insurrection, 
American and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators. 
• Former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz testified that the war 
would cost the nation very little, and that Iraq’s oil revenues would allow 
it to “finance its own reconstruction.” 
 
The authorization for war in Iraq, then, was clearly premised on the Bush 
Administration’s representation that it would involve little or no sacrifice.  For President 
Bush to now unilaterally decide that the nation should make extreme sacrifices pursuing a 
plan that lacks support of the Congress (including his own party), the military, and the 
American people is a bait-and-switch exercise.  Such action would be contrary to the 
fundamental constitutional principles that demand public deliberation and assent before 
committing the nation’s people, treasury, and prestige to war on this new scale.  (This is 
so even though such action would not technically violate any rule of constitutional law, 
due to Congress’s authorization of the Iraq War.)  
 
Before embarking on any escalation, the President should seek the assent of Congress and 
the American people.  If he will not, the American people should understand that 
Congress has the power to stop him. 
 
Neil Kinkopf is an Associate Professor of Law at Georgia State University.  He served as 
a constitutional advisor to the Clinton Administration from 1993-1997 in the Department 
of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel. 
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